• Drug Policy - Question of the Week

    Can heroin be used to treat heroin addiction?

    Drug Policy Question of the Week – 6-9-10

    As answered by Mary Jane Borden, Editor of Drug War Facts for the Drug Truth Network on 6-6-10. http://www.drugtruth.net/cms/node/2930

    Question of the Week: Can heroin be used to treat heroin addiction?

    First, a look at the numbers finds that there were approximately 213,000 current users of heroin in the United States in 2008, with current users defined as those who had used the drug in the last month. This kind of use is medically defined as chronic.

    The two physicians looked into heroin addiction in the 2004 Archives of Internal Medicine article entitled, “Treating Opioid Dependence.” They pointed to a scientific basis for heroin addiction by postulating,

    “Chronic heroin abusers end up with an endogenous opioid deficiency because of down-regulation of opioid production. This creates an overwhelming craving.”

    Three synthetic opiates — Methadone, Levomethadyl, and Buprenorphine – have been developed as chronic maintenance therapies to overcome this down regulation and the consequent cravings.

    Very recently – in fact just last week – the prestigious British medical journal, The Lancet, contained an article and commentary concerning the

    “scientific evidence base [that] is emerging to support the effectiveness of maintenance treatment with directly supervised medicinal heroin as a secondline treatment for chronic heroin addiction.”

    Heroin maintenance is targeted toward the

    “5-10% of heroin addicts who fail to benefit from established conventional treatments.”

    Moreover, studies have shown that,

    “treatment with supervised injectable heroin leads to significantly lower use of street heroin than does supervised injectable methadone or optimised oral methadone.”

    Commenting on heroin maintenance, The Lancet concluded,

    “The existing interference and non-evidence-based opposition from politicians and care providers, who refuse to acknowledge the limitations of methadone maintenance and the superiority of prescribed heroin in selected populations, is arguably unethical. Denying effective second-line therapy to those in need ultimately serves to condemn many users of illicit heroin to the all too common outcomes of untreated heroin addiction, including HIV infection or death from overdose.”

    These facts and others like them come from the Heroin and Heroin Maintenance chapters of Drug War Facts.

    Questions concerning these or other facts concerning drug policy can be e-mailed to [email protected].

  • Drug Policy - Question of the Week

    What makes drug policy a human rights issue?

    Drug Policy Question of the Week – 6-6-10

    As answered by Mary Jane Borden, Editor of Drug War Facts for the Drug Truth Network on 6-6-10. http://www.drugtruth.net/cms/node/2927

    Question of the Week: What makes drug policy a human rights issue?

    Let’s first count the numbers. In its “Prisoners in 2008” report, the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that the number of inmates in federal, state, and local prisons or jails totaled 2.3 million in 2008. Of the 1.3 million inmates held solely under state jurisdiction, roughly 20% or 266,000 were incarcerated because of drug sentences, and of those prisoners, a remarkable two thirds or 173,000 were black or Hispanic.

    Despite the punishment of prison, those processed through the criminal justice system in the United States may also lose a fundamental right supposedly accorded to all citizens – the right to vote. A March 2010 report from the Sentencing Project estimated that,

    “5.3 million Americans, or one in forty-one adults, have currently or permanently lost their voting rights as a result of a felony conviction.”

    The Sentencing Project predicts,

    “Given current rates of incarceration, three in ten of the next generation of black men can expect to be disenfranchised at some point in their lifetime. In states that disenfranchise ex-offenders, as many as 40% of black men may permanently lose their right to vote.”

    The 2010 report, “Death Penalty for Drug Offences,” from the International Harm Reduction Association examined another important human rights issue. The report placed the United States among the 58 countries worldwide that maintain laws prescribing the death penalty for drug offences. The IHRA stated that in some countries,

    “drug offenders make up a significant portion – if not the outright majority – of those executed each year.”

    The IHRA concluded,

    “The death penalty for drug offences is an issue of considerable human rights concern, one demanding the attention of abolitionists, harm reductionists and drug policy reformers alike.”

    These facts and others like them come from the Prisons and Jails and the Civil Rights chapters of Drug War Facts.

  • Drug Policy - Law Enforcement & Prisons - Question of the Week

    The effectiveness of paramilitary drug law enforcement

    Drug Policy Question of the Week – 5-25-10

    As answered by Mary Jane Borden, Editor of Drug War Facts for the Drug Truth Network on 5-25-10. http://www.drugtruth.net/cms/node/2912

    Question of the Week: Is the use of paramilitary SWAT raids in drug enforcement effective?

    First, let’s count the numbers. The Office of National Drug Control Policy noted in its fiscal year 2010 Budget Summary that,

    “For FY 2007,  … there were almost 620 HIDTA [High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas] initiatives.”

    The ONDCP said that these

    “HIDTA initiatives … seized $673 million in cash, and $203 million in noncash assets from drug traffickers.” And “These initiatives identified more than 7,300 DTOs [drug trafficking organizations] operating in their areas.”

    SWAT units are often integrated into HIDTA initiatives.

    Rodney Balko found in his 2006 Cato Institute analysis that

    “these increasingly frequent raids, 40,000 per year by one estimate, are needlessly subjecting nonviolent drug offenders, bystanders, and wrongly targeted civilians to the terror of having their homes invaded while they’re sleeping, usually by teams of heavily armed paramilitary units dressed not as police officers but as soldiers.”

    Further, Balko countered that the seizure of cash and assets, called forfeiture, cause

    “police officials [to] feel increasing pressure to send SWAT teams out on drug assignments, where the assets seized come back to the department and can help offset the costs of having a SWAT team in the first place.”

    So, despite disrupting drug traffickers and seizing of hundreds of millions of assets, often needed to fund the SWAT teams themselves, HIDTA still identified over seven thousand drug trafficking organizations. Sound effective?

    Further, a new report by the International Center for Science in Drug Policy reviewed the scientific evidence concerning this approach to drug law enforcement and confirmed that it,

    “contributes to gun violence and high homicide rates and that increasingly sophisticated methods of disrupting organizations involved in drug distribution could unintentionally increase violence.”

    Possibly, violence begets violence?

    These facts and others like them come from the Drug Interdiction Chapter of Drug War Facts.

  • Cannabis & Hemp - Drug Policy - Question of the Week

    The federal government’s failure to find any positive use for marijuana

    Drug Policy Question of the Week – 5-19-10

    As answered by Mary Jane Borden, Editor of Drug War Facts for the Drug Truth Network on 5-19-10. http://www.drugtruth.net/cms/node/2902

    Question of the Week: Why has the federal government failed to find any positive use for marijuana?

    Let’s say that it did, but it didn’t.

    In his 1998 ruling called “In the Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition” the DEA’s Administrative Law Judge Francis Young recommended,

    “that the Administrator [of the DEA] conclude that the marijuana plant considered as a whole has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, that there is no lack of accepted safety for use of it under medical supervision and that it may lawfully be transferred from Schedule I to Schedule II.”

    That ruling might suggest that the government found positive use for marijuana, but that was 20 years ago. Despite Judge Young’s ruling, marijuana still remains in the most restrictive Schedule I of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act along with heroin, LSD, and GHB.

    Flash forward almost 22 years to the column “Medical Marijuana and the Law,” that appeared in the April 22, 2010 edition of the New England Journal of Medicine. This article revealed,

    “Restrictive federal law and, until recently, aggressive federal law enforcement have hamstrung research and medical practice involving marijuana.”

    Yet, despite federal policymakers having hamstrung research and medical practice involving marijuana, four patients continue to receive an ongoing supply of medical cannabis under the federal government’s Compassionate IND program established around the same time as Judge Young’s 1988 ruling. Further, a research review by Americans for Safe Access concluded that,

    “a privately funded study of these patients confirmed that they benefited from their use of medical cannabis.”

    To summarize, Judge Young appeared to find “positive use” for marijuana over 20 years ago, yet federal policymakers have “hamstrung research,” while at the same time provided an “ongoing supply” to four patients who have “benefitted from their use” of cannabis.

    And of course, you can also find facts concerning medical marijuana like these from the Congressional Research Service at Drug War Facts in the Medical Marijuana Chapter.

  • Cannabis & Hemp - Drug Policy - Question of the Week

    Teen use in states that have medical marijuana laws

    Drug Policy Question of the Week – 5-10-10

    As answered by Mary Jane Borden, Editor of Drug War Facts for the Drug Truth Network on 5-10-10.  http://www.drugtruth.net/cms/node/2890

    Question of the Week: Is teen use of marijuana is higher in states with medical marijuana laws than in states without them?

    The Congressional Research Service took a look at this issue in its April 2010 report entitled, “Medical Marijuana: Review and Analysis of Federal and State Policies.”

    The report stated,

    “A statistical analysis of marijuana use by emergency room patients and arrestees in four states with medical marijuana programs—California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington—found no statistically significant increase in recreational marijuana use … after medical marijuana was approved.”

    The CRS report referred to

    “Another study [that] looked at adolescent marijuana use and found decreases in youth usage in every state with a medical marijuana law. Declines in usage exceeding 50% were found in some age groups,”

    The CRS report added,

    “California, the state with the largest and longest-running medical marijuana program, ranked 34th in the percentage of persons age 12-17 reporting marijuana use in the past month.”

    Finally, the CRS report concluded that,

    “No clear patterns [concerning teen use] are apparent … “ state-to-state and that “more important factors are at work in determining a state’s prevalence of recreational marijuana use than whether the state has a medical marijuana program.”

    The Federation of American Scientists maintains a collection of Congressional Research Service reports on its website at www.fas.org. You can find this extensive 51-page overview of medical marijuana there by searching on the key word ‘marijuana.’

    And of course, you can also find facts concerning medical marijuana like these from the Congressional Research Service at Drug War Facts in the Medical Marijuana Chapter.

  • Drug Policy

    The Price of the Drug War

    The price that Americans are paying for the drug war has become an issue in these times of severe federal, state, and local budget deficits. Some of these costs can be found within the Economics link at Drug War Facts and have been distilled into the flyer, “The Federal, State, and Local Price of the Drug War.”

    Consider these costs, remembering that each point represents a direct quote from the linked authoritative source:

    $714 billion – That’s the current Federal budget deficit as of April 2010.

    $48.7 billion – That was total estimated cost of U.S. drug prohibition in 2008.

    $6.2 billion– That’s the price America paid to imprison drug offenders in 2007.

    $2 billion – That’s what was spent on counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan from 2005-2009. This, of course, excludes the cost of the war.

    $1.4 billion – That’s how much revenue California is losing or really the funds that the state could collect if it taxed marijuana.

    Please note that these costs were also the subject of the first of a new series of audio segments for Drug War Facts on the Drug Truth Network, with this first segment airing on May 3, 2010.

  • Cannabis & Hemp

    Assuaging the Opposition

    If you’re from Ohio or interested in its cannabis policies, you may have seen my April 7th interview with the Ohio News Network (ONN):

    http://www.10tv.com/live/content/onnnews/stories/2010/04/07/story-medical-marijuana.html

    Via ONN, this interview made its way across state to Toledo and maybe beyond.

    http://www.wtol.com/global/story.asp?s=12275194

    I was interested to hear the comments made by Patricia Harmon of the Drug Free Action Alliance. For one, Ms. Harmon asserted,

    “In states that have passed medical marijuana laws, the youth use is higher than it is in states that have not passed it.”

    Not so. A 2009 Congressional Research Service review of state and federal policies concerning medical marijuana concluded,

    “No clear patterns [concerning teen use] are apparent in the state-level data. Clearly, more important factors are at work in determining a state’s prevalence of recreational marijuana use than whether the state has a medical marijuana program.” (p. 32)

    In fact,

    “California, the state with the largest and longest-running medical marijuana program, ranked 34th in the percentage of persons age 12-17 reporting marijuana use in the past month during the period 2002-2003.” (p. 32)

    Ms. Harmon also claimed that

    “the federal government has failed to find any positive use for marijuana.”

    I would characterize that to be a failure as well. In 1998, DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration] Administrative Law Judge Francis Young recommended,

    “that the Administrator [of the DEA] conclude that the marijuana plant considered as a whole has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, that there is no lack of accepted safety for use of it under medical supervision and that it may lawfully be transferred from Schedule I to Schedule II.” (p. 68)

    That was over 20 years ago. Further, because cannabis remains in Schedule I in defiance of his recommendation, the federal government has routinely obstructed research.

    According to an April 2010 “Perspective” piece in the New England Journal of Medicine,

    “Restrictive federal law and, until recently, aggressive federal law enforcement have hamstrung research and medical practice involving marijuana.” (p. 1453)

    Thus, it’s a circular argument to on one hand conclude that the federal government has failed to “find any positive use for marijuana,” while on the other hand, have that same government thwart the very research that would find that positive use.

    All in all, I was pleased with the interview, for it served as a great opportunity to meet the opposition and assuage their concerns.

  • Drug Policy

    Take a new look at Drug War Facts

    Those interested in drug policy need to take a new look at Drug War Facts . This long standing project of Common Sense for Drug Policy has been a staple of drug policy research for more than ten years. The resource has recently undergone a thorough review and renovation to not only continue its display of salient Facts and their proper citations, but also now include a link to each Fact’s source, usually a PDF file. The 1,200 Facts (direct quotes) that comprise Drug War Facts place over 400 reports from governments, peer-reviewed journals, think tanks, and other authoritative sources at the fingertips of drug policy researchers. From marijuana to methadone, from drug courts to drug diversion, the 45 Chapters of Drug War Facts, cover all aspects of illicit drugs and the public policies toward them both within the U.S. and across the world.

    The factbase of Drug War Facts continues to be expanded, with new Facts and sources on display at http://drugwarfacts.org/cms/Recent_Facts. A series of flyers entitled “from Chapters of Drug War Facts” have been created to distill Facts concerning specific Chapters or drug policy issues into one page lists that can be found here http://mapinc.org/url/fDCZMZ4O, with the inaugural flyer, “The Federal, State, and Local Price of the Drug War,” at http://mapinc.org/url/8Xg6AK9z.

    Suggestions for sources, corrections to existing Facts, and general comments concerning Drug War Facts are always welcome and should be directed to Mary Jane Borden at [email protected].

  • Drug Policy

    The Case for Drug Regulation

    By Mary Jane Borden

    Note: This post was written on September 19, 2001, just days after 9/11.

    The tragedy that unfolded the morning of September 11, 2001, shook America to its core. Surely we will look back upon that day, that moment in time, as the turning point on which everything changed. Nothing will ever be the same. We have a new, faceless enemy, one whose thinking is foreign to us, who is able to strike strategic targets leaving few foot prints, and who can wreak massive havoc in mere minutes. This enemy has no geographic boundaries and few demographics. It’s only common thread appears to be a deep-rooted hatred of the United States, based somewhat on our past sins in their eyes and somewhat on their resentment of our individual freedoms.

    Dealing effectively with this new enemy requires a new way of thinking and new tactics. Perhaps all of our conclusions rendered before September 11 need to be reevaluated in this new light. One conclusion requiring reexamination must be the “War on Drugs.” We must think seriously about ending the drug war for three fundamental reasons. While each of these reasons alone is powerful justification, they become even more compelling when evaluated together.

    1.) Proceeds from the drug war fund terrorists. All illegal drugs are different and vary in source of origin and profit potential for terrorists. While gang-related, international marijuana distribution networks do exist, marijuana still tends to be a “mom and pop,” “homegrown” operation simply because the barriers of entry to the market are exceedingly low and because the end-result needs little or no refining to achieve finished product. However, both heroin and cocaine (and, of course, a host of other illegal drugs from Ecstasy to methamphetamine) require additional processing beyond the plant phase to render sellable product. This raises the barrier to market entry and increases the time and expense necessary to create finished product. This is why, with the exception of marijuana, the sale and distribution of illegal drugs require the cooperation of organized crime, rogue states (like Afghanistan), or countries with significant anti-government insurgency groups (like Columbia’s FARC).

    Whereas the proceeds from marijuana transactions stand a good chance of going to “mom and pop,” clearly large sums of money are flowing to organized crime, rogue states, and anti-government insurgency groups. While this money may simply be funding big planes, fancy cars, or large estates or reinvested operationally in new equipment and technology, a significant chunk also flows to terrorists, particularly in Afghanistan, one of the largest worldwide sources of opium.

    For example, last July, the Taliban announced with great fervor that it was eradicating all opium poppies from Afghanistan, and a visit from international inspectors confirmed this to be true. However, further study indicated the Taliban actually stockpiled what they earlier destroyed in the hope that world prices would rise. A five-member UN panel that monitors the UN arms embargo on the Taliban rendered this chilling conclusion several months before September 11: the Taliban was using proceeds from the sale of its stockpile to “finance the training of terrorists and support the operations of extremists in neighboring countries and beyond.”

    2.) The drug war incorrectly identifies the enemy. Years of political posturing, legislation, police action, and media reporting have painted drug users and dealers as “enemies of the state.” The war on them has resulted in over two million people in U.S. prisons, a disproportionate number being people of color. We may have simplistically thought that if we arrested, drug tested, and applied enough “zero tolerance,” the bad guys could easily be identified and eliminated. But as it turns out, the intelligence apparatus put in place to identify and eliminate bad guys completely missed the mark on September 11.

    For example, two weeks before the September 11 catastrophe, approximately fifty agents from the FBI and Michigan State police raided and ultimately shot and killed two men who became known for holding events that advocated the legalization of marijuana on their rural Rainbow Farm in southern Michigan. Even before this raid took place, significant time and money was spent monitoring the Rainbow Farm and creating the case which ultimately led to the raid. The two men certainly may not have been guiltless, but with 20/20 hindsight, was this the best use of law enforcement? While agents raided the Rainbow Farm that advocated for a plant that kills few if any, terrorists were putting the finishing touches on a plan that would almost instantly annihilate 5,000+ people.

    To further illustrate how the enemy was misidentified, one U.S. general, when asked by Dan Rather why U.S. Airforce jets did not intercept the airliners after they strayed from their flight plans, responded that, since the end of the Cold War, fighter jets have been more geared toward interdicting drug shipments. The airliners simply weren’t considered a military threat.

    As a final irony, to reward the Afghanis for eliminating their opium crop the United States paid the Taliban about $40 million last spring. The enemy was not only misidentified; they profited in two ways from our ignorance: the sale of illegal drugs themselves and our reward for eradicating them.

    3.) To fight the “War on Terrorism” the U.S will need additional sources of funding. The War on Drugs already costs the United States $20 billion per year, with an approximate $10 billion spent on battling marijuana alone.

    If no planes had ever struck the World Trade Center or Pentagon, the United States would have found itself in a state of economic uncertainty. A recession had been brewing for almost a year. Most of the rest of the developed world has been in its the midst at some point over the past five years. It was our turn. In addition, the Bush administration and Congress implemented a trillion-dollar, multi-year tax cut at the end of August. Not more than a week before the terrorist attack, the Congressional Budget Office reported that the national surplus had shrunk dramatically. The economic slowdown combined with the dwindling surplus made the politically unpopular tapping of Social Security trust fund a possible reality.

    Then terrorists brutally attacked the U.S. Less than three days later, Congress doubled President Bush’s $20 billion request for aid, offering up $40 billion to fight terrorism and rebuild that which was destroyed. Next, they allocated $17 billion to help up the airline industry recover from the catastrophe. In the excitement and grief of the moment, we forgot that, basically, we don’t have the money. The fervor of the moment will eventually wear off and tax increases will likely become as unpopular and politically treacherous as ever.

    It can be said that there are two ways to make money: raise income or lower expenses. In a country with a weakened economy, raising income in the form of tax revenue may be as fruitful as bleeding a turnip. The only alternative will be to cut spending. What should we cut? Education? Healthcare?
    Environmental cleanup? The “War on Drugs”? If this is truly a war, than all options must be on the table, including ending the drug war.

    But eliminating drug war spending might not be enough. During a recession as people lose their jobs, tax revenue will decline. Even if the U.S. immediately stopped spending $20 billion to fight the “War on Drugs” and cut many other “sacred cows,” we still may not arrive at the breakeven point where revenue equals expenses. An economic stimulus is in order, something that will both generate additional tax revenue and encourage greater economic activity. This is why the distribution channels for what are now illegal drugs must be regulated.

    Selling drugs through regulated channels allows them to be taxed, with tax going to the government rather than organized crime, rogue states, or anti-government insurgents. However, simply gaining more tax revenue won’t stimulate the economy. One long-overlooked product, hemp, must be legitimized.

    Hemp has a myriad of uses from building materials to medicine. Perhaps these recent events serve as one more illustration as to why we need to end our dependence on Middle Eastern oil. This past summer a modified Mercedes Benz traveled across the United States and Canada fueled essentially by distilled hemp. Hemp can be used to make cloth, rope, lubricants, plastics, and a host of other products now produced from fossil fuels. Gearing up these industries generates economic growth and creates jobs which, in turn, translates into ever greater tax revenue.

    In summary, the United States has reached a turning point and will now move into a future that can’t necessarily be programmed by the past. Obviously, we must fight the “War on Terrorism, but our other war, the “War on Drugs,” must be reevaluated because it, in part, funds terrorism; like race and ethnicity, misidentifies the enemy; and simply costs too much. Additional reasons to modify traditional drug war tactics include:

    4.) enlisting the cooperation with authorities of the nearly six million regular drug users by ending their fear of arrest and prosecution,

    5.) bringing troubled users closer to vitally needed treatment programs by routing them a system that less legally threatening,

    6.) controlling a major means of transmitting the AIDS virus and other infectious diseases, and

    7.) doing what we do best: applying principles of freedom and liberty to create free or regulated markets.

    Everything changed on September 11, 2001. Politicians and statesmen of the future will be judged by how they responded in the aftermath of that terrorist attack. If they fall back to pre-September 11 rhetoric and rules, while ignoring new strategies and thinking, we may again miss the next terrorist attack that could unfortunately wreak even more havoc. If we pursue with the same rigor old drug war tactics, we risk losing the freedoms we value and becoming more like our attackers. Essentially, they win.

    Americans should not be lulled into thinking that terrorism began and ended with the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. We may well catch and punish the perpetrators, and we may implement procedures and methods that more easily detect would-be bad guys. Our adversaries have no geographic boundaries and few demographics. What they have is an intense, fanatic desire that may be with us for years to come. Because we are now watching and waiting, they will need to be even more clever, cunning, and insidious than ever before. This will require money. The best way to counter terrorism is to eliminate their source of funding. The best way to eliminate funding is to end the “War on Drugs.”

    Appendix A: A plan for ending the War on Drugs internationally.

    1.    Within the next six months, the United States should convene a meeting of its allies in the “War on Terrorism” with the specific purpose of addressing drug trafficking. All ideas should be openly debated, but significant focus should be given to setting a worldwide-regulated system of production and distribution for what are now illegal drugs.

    2.    Not all of what are now illegal drugs should be regulated. Some should remain illegal. The group should address the regulation of at least the “big three:” marijuana, heroin, and cocaine. Ecstasy regulation could also be considered.

    3.    Within a prescribed period of time, each country should implement a system of its own choosing, determining a.) which drugs to regulate. b.) how production should be regulated (by private companies or only by state-owned organizations). c.) through what outlets these drugs should be sold. Let’s say hammering this out takes a year.

    4.    Another year should be allocated to implementing the plans and another six months should be devoted to a “grace period” in which drug users and dealers get used to this new system and during which the kinks in it can be worked out.

    5.    After two-and-a-half to three years, these systems should be fully implemented and the profits from formerly illegal drugs should begin into the treasuries of their respective countries.

    6.    No country will be required to participate in this plan, but those who choose not to should be monitored by the UN to ensure that they aren’t undercutting legal markets, thereby funneling income to terrorists.

    Appendix B: A plan for ending the War on Drugs within the U.S.

    1.    The United States should fully participate in all discussions about ending the “War on Drugs” with the United Nations and its allies in the “War on Terrorism.” We should not stack the deck only with certain politically-motivated solutions.

    2.    In accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures (GAAP), a system should be established to track the flow of money for what are now illegal drugs from the individual transaction up to gross sales. This establishes audit trails to follow where the money goes. All sales should be subject to applicable local, state, and federal taxes.

    3.    Not all of what are now illegal drugs should necessarily be subject to regulation. Essentially, we should concentrate on those that currently account for the most illegal sales: marijuana, heroin, and cocaine (and possibly Ecstasy). If the experience of other countries that have regulated drugs (e.g. Netherlands) holds true, a drop in overall drug usage may occur over time. If other drugs become attractive offerings of organized crime achieving a prescribed level of estimated sales volume, then these should be considered for regulation, too.

    4.   It should be recognized that not all of what are now illegal drugs are not the same. Systems developed for “soft” drugs like marijuana should be granted greater production, distribution, and marketing liberty than those for “hard” drugs.

    5.   Each state can decide upon its own venue through which drug sales can occur. Some may choose the pharmacy model, others the “State store” model, and others private vendors. Each state would be responsible for regulating these outlets, but would be required to adhere to Federal requirements.

    6.   The production of hard drugs should be business of private companies, not the Federal government. These businesses should be tightly regulated and subject to rigorous, unscheduled audits. The current infrastructure of the DEA would oversee these businesses.

    7.    Corporations producing hard drugs should be viewed somewhat like public utilities without the geographic constraints. They can sell stock, but would be forbidden from conducting product or delivery-system improvement research and development. They also would be prohibited from engaging in competitive marketing or promotional advertising.

    8.   Pricing for hard drugs should be created using econometric models. These models should be based on the assumption that a price set too low might increase usage, but a price set too high, might again provide an incentive for illegal sales. The goal of pricing will not be to necessarily discourage use, but to discourage illegal, unregulated markets that might generate untraceable revenue.

    9.    During the time when this present system is being established, current law would remain in effect. After the system is implemented, drug users would be granted a six-month grace period during which non-regulated transactions would receive no punishment.

    10.   After full implementation of the regulated system, any transaction outside of it would be dealt with harshly, perhaps even more harshly than now, under the assumption that illegal sales fund terrorists. Laws regarding asset forfeiture would remain in place to further punish any sales outside the system.

    11.    The system for “soft” drugs like marijuana would be more closely modeled on those presently in place for alcohol and tobacco, although advertising should be regulated to disallow any unsubstantiated medical claims. To make therapeutic claims, marijuana should be subject to the same clinical trial process as any other drug.

    12.    Individuals should be allowed to grow approximately twenty plants for personal use. Any greater amount would constitute a “farm” which would require a growing license. States can establish methods for implementing this license and regulating production.

    13.    Within the next six months all regulations which prohibit the importation of hemp should lifted. States who have already passed legislation on hemp research should be immediately given the green light to proceed. States should regulate the production of hemp in the same way they oversee other agricultural crops. Jurisdiction over hemp production should be shifted away from the DEA.

    14.    Companies and governmental entities could continue drug testing, and apply it as they see fit within the scope of current Constitutional law. However, they will need to understand that drug testing won’t necessarily uncover terrorists, nor protect them when they have failed to identify a terrorist threat.